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The policing services offered by private security companies have been embraced enthusias-
tically by public and private entities the world over. It is argued in this paper that the
impact of the ‘‘privatization’’ trend is, however, underestimated and understudied. In order
to understand the importance of the phenomenon, and to measure its impact, it is important
for researchers to undertake international comparisons of both the reach of private security
and the extent to which its industries shape and complement the policing task. In pursuit of
that end, this paper is designed to provide a snapshot description of the coverage of private
security industries worldwide (where current information is available), along with an
analysis of their impact.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, a significant restructuring of policing, especially
in North America and the European Union (EU), has led to private industries
now occupying a major position in ‘‘police extended families’’ (Law Com-
mission of Canada, 2002; Johnston, 2003; Crawford and Lister, 2004). Indeed,
the commercial market for private policing generally and private security more
specifically expands inexorably. As Clifford Shearing and colleagues signaled
a quarter-century ago: ‘‘[p]rivate security has developed so rapidly and unob-
trusively, that its presence represents nothing less than a quiet revolution in
policing’’ (1980, p. 1). The trend continues. Those who were pioneers in
developing and building private security industries are witnessing a lucrative
return on their investments. One recent estimate suggests that world demand
for private contractual security service will grow 7.7 per cent annually until at
least 2008 (Freedonia, 2005).
All of this is not particularly surprising, given that the publicly funded
agencies of order maintenance that evolved and grew during the nineteenth-
century development of modern policing never really eradicated the private
forms of policing that had preceded them (Johnston, 1992). The upshot of this
resurgence is a modern mix of public and private options and roles. According
to Lucia Zedner,
the publicly employed officers of state police have been generally regarded as
synonymous with the criminal justice state. It now appears increasingly possible
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that this model of the police may come to be seen as an historical blip in a more
enduring schema of policing as an array of activities undertaken by multiple private
and public agencies, and individual and communal endeavours. In the longer term,
that archetypical modern state venture  the criminal justice system may itself be
regarded as historical anomaly (2006, p. 81).
Uniformed security guards are, by far, the most observable exponents of
private security occupations. Their presence has considerably intensified
alongside the police and police-like bodies (e.g. city wardens) safeguarding
urban areas (Crawford et al., 2005). It is especially in mass private-property
environments such as shopping malls, airport terminals, holiday resorts, indus-
trial complexes and office parks that private guarding is on the rise (Sarre,
2005). Private personnel have thus become an integral part of overall policing
strategies, or, as some would prefer to say, ‘‘governance of security’’ (John-
ston and Shearing, 2003, p. 9).
In order to facilitate these developments, private security industries are
now actively promoting an image of a sector that is able to distance itself from
an unsavory reputation (O’Connor et al., 2004). Moreover, they are now offer-
ing a kaleidoscope of professional services and a greater variety of products
than ever before, including manned guarding (both ‘‘in-house’’ and ‘‘con-
tract’’), alarm monitoring, security equipment production and installation,
transportation of cash, investigation of white-collar crime and provision of
advice on risk management (George and Button, 2000; Button, 2002).
Given the ‘‘silent rise’’ of private security, it is remarkable that the body of
knowledge on the extent and powers of private security, although steadily
evolving, is still rather limited. There is, to date, very little knowledge about
the size and nature of the security industry worldwide. Clifford Shearing
observes that
[w]hile private security is certainly no longer a subject that languishes on a forgot-
ten scholarly back burner, it remains surprisingly under researched. Despite its
obvious importance to the governance of security, scholars continue to focus far
more attention on the police than they do the various other agents and agencies that
provide for security (Shearing, 2003, p. xvii).
Researchers, but also politicians and policy-makers, often take the presence of
private players simply for granted as ‘‘minor’’ players in the policing land-
scape. Their prominence is, however, overlooked at one’s peril. It is essential
that researchers devote greater attention to the blossoming of private security
companies in order to determine what they can and cannot offer society in
terms of upholding social order.
In order to pursue that goal, this article will address five main issues. First,
we underline that the mushrooming of commercial guarding agencies poses a
challenge to the sovereignty of nation states. Policing is scattered away from
’blue colored’ forces, thus challenging the traditional centralized methods of
regulating society. Second, attention is paid to the barriers encountered when
one attempts to measure the size of private security industries around the
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globe, although some useful, albeit cautious, estimates can still be made.
Third, a modest international comparison of private security companies and
firms is presented. Fourth, after describing trends in private security, we use an
analytical lens through which to identify and explain why private security will
continue to dominate the policing ‘‘market’’ into the foreseeable future, and
finally, the article concludes with a research agenda, which stresses the need
for good data and well-informed debate.
Why Private Security is a Challenge for Societies
The provision of policing is rapidly being redesigned across the globe. Its
private forms disperse in a number of ways. ‘‘Commercialized’’ or ‘‘paid’’
security is the most pervasive and challenging one. David Bayley and Clifford
Shearing state that the augmentation of specialized security companies, along
with other non-state bodies and agents, into the field of policing implies
a watershed in the evolutions of their systems of crime control and law enforce-
ment. Future generations will look back on our era as a time when one system of
policing ended and another took its place (1996, p. 588).
Their premise assumes that the ‘‘governance of security’’ is no longer, if it
ever was, the sole monopoly of the constitutional state. Today the growth of
‘‘mass private property’’ such as shopping malls and airport terminals, in
company with a growing complexity and social heterogeneity within urban
societies, erodes the ‘‘steering’’ role of governments and their police forces.
Policing is being restructured along the lines of markets, residential communi-
ties and cultural communities, a tendency which overthrows the ‘‘Hobbesian-
Weberian framework where the public sphere is the sphere of the governors
and the private sphere is the sphere of the governed’’ (Shearing, 2006, p. 31).
Crime control has, in other words, become everybody’s business. Nowadays,
security guards, community volunteers and other private policing providers
regularly patrol the vast majority of spaces where people spend their daily
lives.
Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn (2002, 2006) have warned that one must
not generalize too widely in making these observations lest one lose sight of
the different historical paths that ‘‘local political cultures’’ follow (2006, p.
9.). But despite disagreements about how to interpret what is evolving,
scholars widely recognize the process of ‘‘pluralization’’ (more specifically,
‘‘privatization’’) of policing and the unique challenge this phenomenon poses
to modern order maintenance.
Determining the Breadth and Depth of the Private Security ‘‘Industry’’
On an empirical level, private security is difficult to define. Indeed, Eliza-
beth Joh refers to it as a ‘‘paradoxical’’ term (2004). Although the law draws a
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clear distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private,’ both sectors are increasingly
difficult to tell apart. Today, the police and the private security industries
perform many of the same tasks and have many of the same sorts of responsi-
bilities. As Philip Stenning outlines,
it is now almost impossible to identify any function or responsibility of the public
police which is not, somewhere and under some circumstances, assumed and per-
formed by private police in democratic societies (2000, p. 328).
Additionally, and to make things more complicated, the private security
‘‘industry’’ is not some clearly defined homogenous group, but rather a multi-
tude of sectors, large and small, all related to the provision of security and
investigation services, crime prevention, systems planning, technical consult-
ing and security design (George and Button, 2000, p. 15). Often these indus-
tries are very different from each other in structure, authority, purpose and
method, and when one adds the sheer variety of private security occupations,
trying to determine the size of the industry becomes an almost impossible task
(Jones and Newburn, 1995, pp. 223-224).
Moreover, the quality of accessible data varies considerably from source to
source. Indeed, ‘‘[w]hat has mostly been available are fragments of informa-
tion, mixed with speculation and dramatic claims, especially when the media
get involved’’ (Sarre and Prenzler, 2005, pp. 7-8). For example, registration
systems do not always differentiate between full-time personnel and the size-
able group of part-time personnel. This lack of clarity about the number of
staff employed probably leads to an over-estimation of the actual work forces
of security industries. On the other hand, however, ‘‘in-house’’ staff are
sometimes not counted, so it could also be argued that the numbers of private
security are, in reality, under-estimated. Furthermore, most private firms do
not like to advertise their earnings and personnel numbers. Because competi-
tion is fierce amongst companies, they are, quite understandably, not eager to
disclose confidential and sensitive information about market share and reve-
nues. Finally, private security tasks are now being undertaken by a variety of
businesses. For example, accountancy firms have been known to set up foren-
sic services for clients, and sometimes offer private detective work. Private
security companies not uncommonly undertake related activities such as
limousine hiring or facility management alongside their general policing activ-
ities. The private security industry thus flows into a range of markets, making
counting a precarious undertaking.
Cross-national Comparisons
Despite the fact that any attempt to measure the scope of the industry
should be hedged with caveats, there is consensus among observers about the
mounting pervasiveness of private companies and personnel in many coun-
tries, referred to (collectively) below as ‘‘private security services’’ or
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‘‘PSSs.’’ The following snapshots from a variety of countries and regions have
been drawn from the growing list of reports and reviews devoted to the subject
of privatized provision of policing. Information on legislative authority and
regulatory conditions is also included in the discussion below, where such
information is available and of interest.
We begin with a comparative picture based upon information available
from Northern and Southern America, Asia, Australia, the Middle East and
Africa. Thereafter, the available data from the 27 EU member states is pre-
sented, followed by information gleaned from agencies in countries proximate
to the EU. The information contained in each of the three tables is drawn from
a number of sources.
The Americas
Security industries are so diverse in North America that their data, while
not difficult to find, are difficult to compare. Early estimates indicate that
429,000 private staff, compared to 694,000 public law enforcement personnel,
were employed in the United States in 1972 (Kakalik and Wildhorn, 1977, p.
Americas             Private security force
USA                             +1,500,000
Canada                                82,000
Mexico                            +153,885
Brazil                                400,000
Asia
Japan                                 459,305
South Korea                      115,845
Pacific
Australia                           +90,000
Middle East
Saudi Arabia                       16,000
Africa
Nigeria                            +100,000
Kenya                                  48,800
Sierra Leone                        +3,000
South Africa                    +250,000
Table 1: Private security services in selected international countries. Sources:
Van Steden and Huberts (2005), Manning (2006), Law Commission of Canada
(2002), Reames (2005), Wood and Cardia (2006), Yoshida and Leishman
(2006), Sarre and Prenzler (2005), Abrahamsen and Williams (2005, a,b,c),
Button et al (2006), Shearing and Berg (2006) and De Jong (2002).
56 VAN STEDEN AND SARRE
18). According to the so-called Hallcrest report, this number had grown to
almost 1 million private employees by 1990 (Cunningham et al., 1990, p. 196-
197). One-and-a-half decades later the USA boasts some 60,000 security
companies, and private industries employ approximately 1.5 to 2 million
guards (Manning, 2006, p. 110). One estimate puts the number of security
workers in Canada at around 82,000 compared to just over 59,000 police
(Law Commission of Canada, 2002, p. 9-10). In Mexico, approximately
10,000 private security firms operate within the country. Yet fewer than half of
these firms have employees who possess an official permit. In December
2000, there were 153,885 registered employees, but their actual number is
probably significantly higher (Reames, 2005, p. 1192). In South America, the
data are very difficult to find. Only Brazil provides some information for our
purposes. A case study suggests that 1,200 private security companies with a
total workforce of 400,000 were available for hire in 1998 (Wood and Cardia,
2006, p. 154). Indeed, the federal police contract with private guards to protect
persons, property and assets, especially in metropolitan areas such as Sco
Paulo. Since 1983, the Brazilian security industry has been covered by special-
ist legislation.
Asia
According to some reports, the security industry in Japan has grown from
775 companies employing 41,146 guards in 1972 to 8,669 companies employ-
ing 377,140 (full-time and part-time) guards in 1996. The security industry
significantly outnumbers the Japanese police force, comprising, on 1996 fig-
ures, over 225,000 officers (Yoshida, 1999). The latest data from Japan in-
dicate that this number has continued to grow since then, to 459,305 security
guards and approximately 240,000 police officers in 2003 (Yoshida and
Leishman, 2006). Government authorities hold powers to sanction security
firms that violate the rules, by the imposition of strict penalties, imprisonment
or the suspension and even termination of business. Even in the centralized
market economy that is China, approximately 250,000 security service
companies had been brought into existence by 1999 as free market competitors
to the internal security system (Guo, 1999). In the Republic of South Korea,
the rate of change has been rapid. From 1978 to 2005, the number of security
personnel rose to well over 115,000 (compared with 93,271 police officers), a
growth rate of 2,320 per cent (Button et al., 2006).
Australia
It is difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the size of the private policing
and security markets in Australia. In 1998-99, the Australian Bureau of Statis-
tics (ABS, 2000) recorded 1,714 businesses in security services industries,
employing over 31,700 persons (Prenzler, 2005). This list included those firms
that identified themselves as such, typically private detectives and inquiry
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agents, but did not include government security agencies, locksmith services,
alarm wholesaling, and security equipment installation. Licensed security
agents, on figures supplied by state licensing agencies in 2003, numbered
approximately 140,000, but this figure includes individuals who hold multiple
licenses. One should compare the number (approximately 48,000 on 2003
figures) of sworn police officers in Australia. Census data show that between
1996 and 2001 the Australian population increased by 6.0 per cent, police
numbers increased by 6.5 per cent and security providers by a staggering 31.1
per cent (Prenzler and Sarre, 2006).
The Middle East
It is difficult to obtain accurate data about private security in the Middle
East. Countries are mostly governed by strict Islamic regimes which exercise
strong control over information on ‘‘sensitive’’ topics such as crime and safe-
ty. Nonetheless, De Jong (2002, p. 36) has conducted explorative research on
the situation in Saudi Arabia and reports that four large security (guarding)
companies employ approximately 3,500 staff throughout the country. They are
part of a larger industry covering some 40 companies and 16,000 staff. Special
legislation dates back to 1992 when the Ministry of the Interior issued Rules of
Private Civil Security. Strikingly, this law obliges owners of, for instance,
banks, jewellery shops and residential compounds to hire commercial guards,
boosting the industry’s growth throughout the 1990s. There is, however, no
evidence that the industry has expanded since then.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Data on Nigeria, Kenya and Sierra Leone have been gathered recently by
Abrahamsen and Williams (2005 a,b,c).3 In Nigeria, private security is the
second largest income earner for the nation after oil and gas. Numbers in the
security guard sector may be as high as 100,000. Virtually any business,
embassy, non-governmental organization (NGO) and residential compound
will have contracts with (armed) private security personnel. Given the huge
socio-economic inequalities that exist throughout Kenya, private security is a
major industry, generating as many as 48,800 jobs. Regardless of the risks
they run, security guards are not permitted to carry firearms. Because of a
brutal civil war which raged across Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002, security
remains a top political priority, hastening a rapid expansion of commercial
guarding services. Although numbers may be much higher, there may be as
many as 30 security companies operating, employing approximately 3,000
persons.
South Africa
The security sector in South Africa may be expanding by as much as 30
per cent per year. 1999 figures indicate that, apart from 60,000 ‘‘in-house’’
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personnel, the industry employs 350,000 guards. When only counting the
number of ‘‘in-house’’ and ‘‘contract’’ security guards, the police/private
security ratio would be 1:3.1, or it could be as high as 1:4 (Minnaar and
Ngoveni, 2004, p. 45). However, Shearing and Berg (2006) are more moderate
in their estimates. They assume the size of registered security officers was
250,000 in 2004, representing a doubling since 1997. Since the fall of the
apartheid regime a number of multinational firms have become established in
South Africa. These massive corporate players absorbed a vast number of local
security businesses, whose numbers dropped from 5,185 in 2001 to 4,271 in
2003.
The European Union
Previous comparative research has indicated the significant contribution of
security companies to internal security within the EU (Ottens et al., 1999; Van
Outrive, 1999; Van Steden and Huberts, 2005; De Waard, 1999), although the
information has been somewhat fragmented. Given the absence of firm and
comparable data, Jaap de Waard, a Dutch civil servant working for the Minis-
try of Justice, published a comprehensive international study of private securi-
ty, covering 27 countries including all the countries of the EU at the time plus
12 others. His study was based upon reports from the European Commission
Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs
in 1996. De Waard estimated that there were 592,050 security personnel in
Europe in a population of 369 million. That meant that there were 160 security
personnel per 100,000 people, compared to 375 police per 100,000. He further
estimated that 75 per cent of security personnel worked for contract firms,
with the remainder ‘‘in-house.’’ De Waard found very large variations in
personnel numbers between countries. Great Britain and Germany had the
most security personnel, with 275 and 217 respectively per 100,000. Finland
and Greece had the lowest proportions with 69 and 19 respectively. Overall,
these 1999 data suggest that, in indicative terms only, police outnumbered
security personnel in the EU by a very rough estimate of 2:1.
On 1 May 2004, 10 new member states successfully joined the existing 15
member states, and then on 1 January 2007 Bulgaria and Romania were added
to the EU bringing the total number to 27. These events had considerable
implications for the number of police officers and commercial security per-
sonnel previously counted by De Waard. His estimates are now well and truly
in need of revision. The statistical snapshot presented below in Table 2
provides a timely update of the best available employment figures in the
public and private policing sectors in the EU. The data are gleaned mainly
from a report published by Morré (2004) and draw on figures collected by the
Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS), the European umbrella
association for private security industries.4 Other data are drawn from
SEESAC (2005).
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Table 2 summarizes the latest estimates of private security industries in the
27 EU member states.
Country    Total Police  Total Private   Private Security/  Private Security/
Security           Population Ratio  Police Ratio
Austria                 30,000            6,790              1/1,208                     0.23
Belgium               39,000          18,320              1/562                        0.47
Bulgaria               28,000        130,000              1/58                          4.6
Cyprus                    3,000            1,500              1/517                        0.50
Czech Republic    47,400          28,100              1/363                        0.59
Denmark              14,000            5,250              1/1,010                     0.38
Estonia                   3,600            4,900              1/286                        1.36
Finland                   7,500            6,000              1/867                        0.80
France                145,000        117,000              1/516                        0.81
Germany            250,000        170,000              1/485                        0.68
Greece                  49,900          25,000              1/428                        0.50
Hungary               40,000          80,000              1/125                        2.00
Ireland                  12,000          20,000              1/195                        1.67
Italy                  280,000*          55,000              1/1,056                     0.20
Latvia                   10,600            5,000              1/460                        0.47
Lithuania              20,000          10,000              1/360                        0.50
Luxembourg           1,573            2,200              1/210                        1.40
Malta                      1,800               700              1/572                        0.39
The Netherlands   49,000          30,000              1/543                        0.61
Poland                103,309        200,000              1/193                        1.94
Portugal                46,000          28,000              1/375                        0.61
Romania               45,830          37,291              1/597                        0.81
Slovakia               21,500          20,840              1/259                        0.97
Slovenia                 7,500            4,500              1/444                        0.60
Spain                  193,450          89,450              1/450                        0.46
Sweden                18,000          10,000              1/530                        0.56
United Kingdom 141,398        150,000              1/401                        1.06
Total               1,609,360     1,255,841              1/395                        0.78
Table 2: Police forces and private security services in 27 EU-Member States.
Sources: Morré, 2004 and SEESAC, 2005. Complements and updates data from van
Steden and Sarre, 2006.
* This number is based on De Waard’s (1999) estimate of the Italian police force
numbers, because of missing data in the CoESS report.
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Western Europe
Germany, the United Kingdom and France are indisputably the leaders
in Western Europe in providing PSSs. As seen in Table 2, in sheer numbers,
Germany takes the first position with approximately 170,000 personnel,
although informed estimates place the number of employees in the United
Kingdom much higher than the 150,000 reported by the sources available to
Morré. For example, Button (2002, p. 99) arrives at a figure of 217,000 private
security staff, whereas Jones and Newburn (1995, p. 229) counted over
300,000 people engaged in private ‘‘policing’’ occupations. Even with the
lower number, police officers are outnumbered by private security in the UK
by a ratio of 1 to 1.06. In France, the ratio is 1 to 0.81, and Germany is slightly
lower again at 1 to 0.68.
Germany has implemented trade regulation laws that apply to security
enterprises, but legal standards are also embedded in other acts. Training and
education are provided by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and by
professional organizations. Operational staff undertake mandatory instruction
(theory) of 40 hours. Managerial staff must attend 80 hours of theory. Special-
ized private security personnel (for example, guards at military installations)
are allowed to carry guns.
In France, commercial security institutions hold a strong position. CoESS
probably underestimates the French public policing system (145,000), for
previous studies show a police strength of at least 227,000 officers (De Waard,
1999, p. 155; Ottens et al., 1999, p. 81). Ocqueteau (2006) maintains that
private security does not challenge the sovereign role of police and the gen-
darmerie. Rather, the industry complements the state’s security resources.
Nevertheless, he concludes that commercial security is an irreversible phe-
nomenon, which will continue to grow in the future.
Legislation for the private security sector in the United Kingdom did not
exist until relatively recently. Private guards, investigators and door super-
visors relied upon voluntary self-regulation (Button, 2002). In 2001, however,
the parliament passed the Private Security Industry Act. It was the first attempt
to regulate contract and ‘‘in-house’’ security guards, the CIT sector, private
investigators, wheel clampers, security consultants, and bodyguards. Its main
contributions were the introduction of a licensing system and the creation of a
Security Industry Authority (SIA) to monitor the quality and legitimacy of
security industry services.
The Republic of Ireland has a huge private security presence (approx-
imately 20,000 strong) and its ratio of police to private security indicates that
the former are well outnumbered by the latter (1 to 1.67). The number of pri-
vate personnel per head of population (1 per 195) is one of the highest in
Europe. Yet Ireland was one of the later countries to set out detailed legal
standards for the industry. The parliament finally passed its Private Security
Services Act in 2004.
THE GROWTH OF PRIVATIZED POLICING 61
In the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg there are more private security
personnel (the overwhelming majority in full-time roles) than police officers (a
ratio of 1 police officer to 1.4 security officers). Possible explanations for this
are the fairly large banking sector and the fact that some central EU institu-
tions are based in Luxembourg. With regard to the private security/population
ratio, Austria has a rate that is the lowest in Europe at 1 private officer per
1,208 population. Nevertheless, there are 200 companies (on 2003 figures)
active in Austria, employing 6,790 people. The annual turnover of C200 mil-
lion (2001) is steadily increasing by 2 per cent to 3 per cent per year. While
there is no specific law for the Austrian security market, there are a few
commercial laws with relevance to specialized (guarding) companies.
Belgium and The Netherlands have moderately-sized private security
industries, with a similar ratio of population to private security. The ratio of
police to private security personnel (1 to 0.47 and 1 to 0.57, respectively) is
similar, too. Both countries have laws that regulate the industry beyond
manned guarding, and include private detectives, alarm monitoring systems,
the cash-in-transit (CIT) sector and ‘‘in-house’’ security workers in their
purview. The key points of Belgian and Dutch laws are similar too, and in-
clude strict regulation of uniforms, training, and criminal background checks.
Contrary to the situation in The Netherlands, however, some Belgian guards
are permitted to carry firearms. The Dutch division of Group 4 Securicor has
been granted permission to provide custodial services to detention centers,
which puts the company in a unique business position (Van Steden and Hu-
berts, 2006).
Central and Eastern Europe
The collapse of socialist bureaucracies and the consequent sale of state
assets have presumably contributed to the spectacular growth of private securi-
ty industries in former Soviet bloc or Warsaw Pact countries (Brodeur et al.,
2003, p. 6). Moreover, Central and Eastern EU member countries have report-
edly suffered from waves of criminal activities within their own borders, thus
providing an incentive for those who can afford it to seek supplementary polic-
ing (Caparini and Marenin, 2005).
Hence, in Central and Eastern Europe, private security companies have
been mushrooming in an array of locations since the fall of the Berlin Wall in
1989. Countries like the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia
are now witnessing strong growth in private security markets. Other Central
and Eastern European EU members have also seen a significant rise in the
number of private security and protection agencies in a growing market. In
Slovakia, Estonia, Hungary, and Poland private security personnel now
match or exceed their corresponding police numbers. In the cases of Poland
and Hungary they are double the police numbers. According to CoESS, the
yearly financial turnover is massive, for example, C40 million in Estonia
(2001 figures) and C933 million in Poland.
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The monitoring of private security in these regions is best described as a
‘‘work in progress.’’ Two of the Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia, regulate
manned guarding services and related areas by their respective security acts.
Lithuania has implemented a law on individuals and property safety. The same
trends are observed in most of the newly admitted EU member states. Except
for the Czech Republic, all governments have instigated specific legal guide-
lines addressing private security. Requirements such as criminal background
checks, identifications cards and special permission to carry handguns are
standard and, in some cases, mandatory (for example, Czech guards). The
Czech Republic and Slovenia offer university training for both public policing
and private policing. Police practitioners and students seeking a career in an
assortment of (governmental) security agencies are taught at the Police
Academy in Prague and the College of Police and Security Studies in Ljublja-
na.
In Romania, along with Bulgaria, the privatization of security has ex-
panded significantly over the last decade. These countries host the most devel-
oped and professional security industries in the region. Given that up-to-date
numbers on police for these two nations are available from SEESAC (2005, p.
109), it is possible to make a rough estimate of the ratio of police to private
security. In Romania the ratio (0.81) is around the average for the EU, assum-
ing, that is, that one can rely upon the data. This may be problematic, as many
guards work without permission and are paid ‘‘under the table’’ (Gounev,
2006, p 117). The Bulgarian ratio (28,000 police to 130,000 private security) is
4.6, or the highest for the EU, again assuming the data are accurate. A 2005
business survey indicated that 54,000 of these are contract guards paid by
PSSs, while the other 70,000 to 80,000 are in-house guards. According to
SEESAC, issues such as the absence of democratic oversight, ineffective
implementation of legislation and rivalry between police forces and security
companies are of major concern to observers (SEESAC, 2005).5
Southern Europe
There is a relatively low private security/police ratio in Southern European
countries. In Greece, for example, a security market barely existed until 1997
(Rigakos and Papanicolaou, 2003, 298). At present, however, there may be as
many as 25,000 to 30,000 private security personnel, which is about half the
number of police officers (Papanicolaou, 2006, p. 86). Legislation was intro-
duced in 1997 to mandate a number of requirements covering security licens-
ing, uniforms, training and dogs. The license-holder’s criminal record must be
checked and he or she is obliged to have joined the Greek army.
Police in Italy employ 280,000 officers, five times the estimated number of
people employed by private security agencies. Likewise, Cyprus, Malta,
Portugal, and Spain make more use of police officers than security guards.
Nevertheless, with the exception of Cyprus, these governments have provided
comprehensive governing frameworks to achieve some form of regulation.
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Even taking into account the problems of accurately measuring private
security personnel numbers, we can safely assume that there are over one
million people employed in private security industries in the EU following its
expansion in 2004. Given De Waard’s figure of almost 600,000 employees
based upon 1996 figures, this amounts to an increase of perhaps 500,000
employees across EU member states in less than a decade. The police/private
security ratio, too, has moved up to 1 to 0.71 overall in 2004 compared to the
EU average of 1 to 0.43 in 1999 (De Waard, 1999, p. 156). Although these
findings are very tentative, and must be treated with caution, it is impossible
not to conclude that there has been a significant growth in private security in
the EU. One can assume that there are a number of factors for this rise, not
only ‘‘natural growth’’ by virtue of the addition of new member states, but
also the belief that PSSs are an appropriate means by which to deal with
perceptions of growing lawlessness generally, as well as the move to market
economies following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Scandinavia
Reliable estimates of private security personnel are available in the three
Scandinavian countries that are members of the EU: Denmark, Finland, and
Sweden. In each country, the private security industry is, in absolute and rela-
tive terms, small. A plausible explanation for this might be the traditionally
low crime rates officially reported in Scandinavian countries. Furthermore, as
De Waard (1999, p. 167) notes, the Danish police, historically, do not enter
into so-called commercial public-private partnerships. The government is thus
reluctant to cooperate with security services. Nevertheless, the latest figures
indicate that there may be over 5,000 private security personnel in Denmark
(for a ratio of 1 to 0.38, police to private security) and double that number in
Sweden, for a not dissimilar ratio of 1 to 0.56.
Finland has a higher level of private security in comparison with its police
force, although, per head of population, it has fewer security personnel (1 per
867) than Sweden (with 1 per 530). Finland’s Act on Private Security Services
(along with supplementary decrees) governs several ‘‘guarding’’ and ‘‘protec-
tion’’ sectors. We find the same kind of regulatory systems in Denmark.
Sweden’s regulatory regime covers most private security areas except alarm
stations, in-house security and cash-in-transit (CIT). In Sweden and Finland,
but not in Denmark, firearms carriage is permitted with special authorization.
All Scandinavian EU countries require basic training for private security em-
ployees.
Southeastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia
The renaissance of private security in the EU is not exceptional to the
region. The following information, as set out in Table 3, offers a useful in-
sight into PSSs in the regions and nations proximate to the EU, and allows
some preliminary comparisons to be made.
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The growth of private security companies in Southeastern Europe is prob-
ably a direct result of perceptions of a growing ‘‘market of violence’’ in the
region (Eppler, 2002). Hence, private security companies have emerged in the
former Yugoslavian countries, such as Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzo-
govina. However, in these countries (if not Albania), concerns have been
raised relating to the (mis)use of weapons, including automatic weapons, by
private security (SEESAC, 2005). Moreover, they have been linked with
armed ethnic minorities in Kosovo.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and a ‘‘hidden’’ private security legacy
prior to the break-up both contributed to the spectacular growth of the private
security industry in Russia (Favarel-Garrigues and Le Huérou, 2004). The
protection market is, by and large, divided between detective agencies, PSSs
and private protection companies (PPCs). In 1999, statistics indicated that
almost 200,000 licensed employees (that is, those who are entitled to carry a
firearm) are working for security services and protection companies, but their
total number probably exceeds 850,000 (Volkov, 2002, p. 137). Not unlike the
position in Southeastern Europe, regulatory structures for the private security
industry are weak in Russia. Despite a 1992 federal law on private detective
and protective activity which gave legal status to the commercial provision of
security, business relations are still highly informal. This informality has had a
negative impact on the transparency and accountability of the industry.
Ukraine, according to 2006 figures, has 33,000 people licensed to under-
take protection work in over 3,000 enterprises, a number that is expanding
rapidly. PSSs in the Ukraine, according to Hiscock, have been known to
engage in illegitimate cooperation with the state (Hiscock, 2006, p. 136).
There is little known about the employment scale of the private security
Eastern Europe (non-EU),    Private security
Russia and Ukraine force
Albania                                               4,100
Bosnia and Herzegovina                  12,000
Croatia                                           115,000
Kosovo                                               2,580
Macedonia                                         3,000
Moldova                                           +3,000
Montenegro                                     +1,900
Serbia                                             130,000
Russia                                          +850,000
Ukraine                                          +33,000
Table 3: Private security services in selected non-EU countries or entities.
Sources: Van Steden and Huberts (2005), SEESAC (2005), Volkov (2002),
Hiscock (2006).
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market in Georgia, although estimates suggest that there may be as many as
250 to 300 PSSs (Hiscock, 2006, p. 141). There are very few rules that regu-
late PSSs and their staff.
Transnational Developments
Allied to the explosive growth of private security is the ascendancy of
transnational security conglomerates mentioned above. Giant multi-nationals
such as the Securitas Group, Group 4 Securicor, Tyco International, Secom,
The Brink’s Company, Sohgo Security Services, Chubb, Corrections Corpora-
tion of America and Prosegur have allowed a ‘‘globalization’’ of commercial-
ized security provision to develop (Johnston, 2000, 2006; Walker, 2003; Wood
and Kempa, 2005). Group 4 Securicor employs an astonishing 405,000 staff,
working in over 100 countries and generating a yearly turnover of C6.1 bil-
lion.6
Moreover, a diversity of commercial security activities is penetrating into
national and sub-national institutions such as fire departments, ambulance
services, car assistance services, custodial services and even military opera-
tions (Group 4 Securicor, 2004; Singer, 2003). One can thus safely predict that
transnational contract security will increasingly expand their functions in
securing local (urban) and national domains across every continent.
Factors Driving Private Security: Discussion, Analysis, and a Research
Agenda
How can we explain such a remarkable renaissance and durability of non-
state forms of order maintenance? It is hard to answer this question unequivo-
cally as pluralization and privatization affect policing ‘‘in different ways and
at different speeds depending on the nature of the social, political and cultural
circumstances in which they are taking place’’ (Jones and Newburn, 2006, p.
5). Nevertheless, the policing, sociological and criminological literature offer
valuable analytical tools for explaining the growth of private security interna-
tionally. The first explanation is that the quest for guards and additional pri-
vate supervisors can be situated within the context of spatial changes (Shear-
ing and Stenning, 1981). Particularly in urban areas, the hegemony of consu-
merism stimulates the emergence of ‘‘quasi-public’’ spaces, such as shopping
malls, sports stadiums and leisure facilities (Wakefield, 2003). Because of
risks related to deviant behaviour disturbing the ambience of such sites, a
‘‘mixed economy’’ of security staff is routinely active here. These are pre-
dominantly security guards, but other agents such as crowd controllers and
stewards are often present.
The fear of crime explanation is a useful one too. Crime rates have risen
sharply over recent decades. Garland (2001) even portrays Western societies
as ‘‘high crime cultures.’’ The terrorist acts of (and since) September 11,
2001, have posed new dangers to national security and have enhanced citizens’
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‘‘search for security’’ (Law Commission of Canada, 2002), which has become
a ‘‘normal’’ fact of life. Moreover, governments have attempted to ‘‘responsi-
bilize’’ civil society for its own risk management (Garland, 2001). For exam-
ple, the Dutch police openly assert that
security is not a matter exclusively for the police. The police need partners and are
therefore looking for ways of establishing worthwhile collaboration ... by which
many police forces aim to establish closer ties with local people. (Ministry of the
Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2004, p. 8)
Closely related to this point, Button argues a lack of government performance
and the financial weakness of states has contributed to the shift in emphasis
(Button, 2002). Police are simply not capable of reassuring everybody. As
governments try to reduce their spending by restricting the funding of public
services such as the police, society is left with a ‘‘security vacuum,’’ which is
filled by private agents and agencies. In circumstances where private security
is unregulated or under-regulated (George and Button, 2000), entrepreneurs
may start businesses without being hindered by legal red-tape, with
sometimes adverse public-image consequences (Livingstone and Hart, 2003).
Finally, in the context of a liquid modernity (Bauman, 2000) where ex-
traordinary dynamism and agility find their counterparts in (ontological) feel-
ings of uncertainty and insecurity, people are collectively yearning for safe
freedom (Boutellier, 2004). The vitality of contemporary western life goes
hand in hand with an obsessive desire for protection. This paradoxical situa-
tion creates the optimal circumstances for private security systems to prolifer-
ate.
As the security industry has grown worldwide, so has debate over the
‘‘quality of life impact’’ of this development (Prenzler, 2004, p. 283). Accord-
ing to some commentators, private security has the potential to disregard
democratic rights, particularly the equality, privacy, and personal freedoms
that citizens should be able to enjoy (Sarre and Prenzler, 2005, p. 202), given
‘‘that they must sell security’’ (Rigakos, 2002, p. 13; italics in the original).
Their overarching interest, thus, is to ‘‘pursue their client’s objectives’’ (Joh,
2004, p. 61) and make profitable business deals (South, 1988). Private security
personnel generally work under an assumption that victims, especially their
fee-paying institutional victims, should be given priority over all other con-
cerns within civil society (Shearing and Stenning, 1983, p. 9). Thus there are
many issues around private security, its purposes and accountabilities that
remain unresolved.
In an attempt to address these questions, observers must continue to turn
their gaze to four key research agendas (Sarre, 2005). Researchers should, first
of all, map out generic patterns of privatized policing internationally and high-
light the differences and similarities between countries. Only through this
exercise can patterns and trends be observed and analyzed.
Researchers should also continue to explore and compare preferred forms
(and forums) of accountability for private security and other auxiliary police
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options and come up with ‘‘what works best’’ in given situations. In doing so,
they are better equipped to advise policy-makers to develop ‘‘law and justice’’
criteria to judge the quality of private accountability systems in various na-
tional and international settings. The research task must also include a discus-
sion of the competing principles that public police and private security es-
pouse, and the precise relationships both sectors should develop with each
other, for despite decades of the development of private/public partnership
models, the relationships between police and their private security counter-
parts remain guarded and tentative.
Finally, researchers should continue to examine the principles, interests,
powers, mentalities, technologies and working methods of private security
businesses (both national and transnational) in order to determine the effects of
private policing on civil liberties, privacy, access to information, human rights
and personnel safety.
CONCLUSION
Commercial security providers, at the very least, in terms of numbers of
personnel and annual expenditures, now dominate the policing landscapes in
many nations of the world (Sarre and Prenzler, 2005, p. 9). The current shifts
towards private options in policing are likely to continue apace. Commercial
integration and the freedom to move goods, capital and services are becoming
progressively more common in a number of regions of the world, and there is
little reason to suspect that there will not be a similar integration of security
services.
The appropriate call is for governments to serve as central anchor points to
facilitate and direct private policing activities and to fund research into them.
Governments cannot shirk their responsibility to coordinate security (facilitat-
ed by public and private funding) to ensure that not only are their citizens
enjoying a satisfactory level of protection at an appropriate cost, but that they
are being protected by a blend of public and private policing that does not
compromise fundamental accountabilities, rights and freedoms.
NOTES
1. Contact information: Ronald van Steden, Ph.D. student, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam,
Netherlands. E-mail: R.van.Steden@fsw.vu.nl
2. Contact information: Rick Sarre, Professor of Law and Criminal Justice, School of Com-
merce, University of South Australia, and Visiting Professor, Law Department, Umeå Universitet,
Sweden. GPO Box 2471, Adelaide, South Australia 5001. Tel: ISD 61 8 8302-0889, Fax: ISD 61 8
8302-0992. E-mail: rick.sarre@unisa.edu.au
3.  For the on-line publications see http://users.aber.ac.uk/rbh/privatesecurity/
publications.html.
4.  See www.coess.org for the full report.
5.  For more information on the security situation in former Yugoslavia and elsewhere in the
Balkans, see the Balkan site within www.seesac.org, the official website of the South Eastern and
Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons.
6.  For more information see www.G4S.com.
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